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My name is John D. Echeverria and I am the Executive Director of the Georgetown 
Environmental Law & Policy Institute at Georgetown University Law Center. I appreciate the 
opportunity to testify today on H.R. 3355, the Homeowners Defense Act of 2007, and to address, 
more generally, the appropriate role of the federal government in supporting the availability of 
fairly priced coastal disaster insurance. The views I offer today are my own, and do not represent 
the position of Georgetown University, Georgetown University Law Center, or the board of the 
Georgetown Environmental Law & Policy Institute. 
 
The Georgetown Environmental Law & Policy Institute recently published a report on this topic 
authored by Justin R. Pidot, a Fellow with the Institute during the 2006-2007 academic year. I 
understand that a copy of the report, Coastal Disaster Insurance in the Era of Global Warming, 
The Case for Relying on the Private Market, will be included in the hearing record. The report is 
also available at: http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/CoastalDisasterInsuranceRepor t.pdf. At 
the outset, I should acknowledge that I am not an expert in insurance law nor in the operations of 
the insurance industry, the reinsurance business, or the broader capital markets. However, I have 
spent a great many years studying, in various contexts, the effects of different liability and 
incentive regimes on the behavior of governments and private entities. Also as reflected by our 
recent report, the Institute has devoted significant resources and energy over the last year to 
studying the implications of different potential government polices relating to coastal disaster 
insurance. 
 
In approaching the issue of coastal disaster insurance, our analysis has been driven by two basic 
policy concerns: fairness and efficiency. In this context, the fairness concern is that citizens and 
communities should generally bear the costs associated with their decisions and that other 
citizens and communities should not be asked to subsidize these costs. The efficiency concern is 
that society as a whole will be better off if citizens and communities make decisions that take full 
account of the private and public costs of their choices. The fairness and efficiency concerns are 
related in the sense that, everything else being equal, avoiding unfair subsidies is likely to 
increase the ability of individuals and communities to make rational, fully-informed decisions 
that will enhance the general welfare. More specifically, in the context of coastal disaster 
insurance, we as a society are more likely to achieve the right level of risk avoidance and risk 
mitigation if citizens make decisions about what to develop and where to develop based on the 
actual costs associated with their choices. 
 
We have concluded that, for several different reasons, a significant government intrusion in the 
market for coastal disaster insurance is not likely to serve the goals of fairness and efficiency. 
For understandable but nonetheless regrettable reasons, government, especially the federal 
government, can generally be expected to do a poor job of supporting coastal disaster insurance 
that is priced to reflect its true cost. The financial burdens imposed by disasters, and/or the 
premiums necessary to cover such losses, create a strong, concentrated, and highly motivated 
constituency seeking financial relief from these burdens. On the other hand, the costs to the 
federal government and in turn to federal taxpayers of providing this relief are dispersed and 
often deferred to the future. As a result of this political dynamic, there is a substantial risk, 
verging on an inevitability, that federal government involvement in the disaster insurance market 
will lead to systematic under- pricing of coastal disaster insurance. Furthermore, the costs to the 
federal taxpayers of federal intervention in the disaster insurance market are likely to increase 
over time. 
 
Under our federal system, responsibility for addressing coastal disaster hazards is generally 
divided between different levels of government. Traditionally, local governments, and to a lesser 
extent state governments, exercise primary regulatory authority over land development. On the 
other hand, disaster relief is generally regarded as a responsibility of the federal government; in 
line with this approach, H.R. 3355 would require the federal government to serve as a financial 
backstop for state insurance programs. If land use regulatory authority remains at the state and 
local levels but the federal government serves as a financial backstop, the level of government 
with the most to gain from development (through increased tax revenues, and general economic 
development) will bear relatively little financial exposure from potentially unwise development, 
whereas the level of government with the greatest financial exposure will have little direct 
authority to limit and mitigate the risks associated with unwise development. This misalignment 
of incentives will tend to encourage unwise coastal development, create greater long-term risks, 
and ultimately impose greater costs on federal taxpayers. 
 
We can predict these outcomes with a fair degree of confidence based on the unfortunate history 
of the National Flood Insurance Program, under which the federal government already plays a 
major role in providing insurance coverage for flood damage associated with coastal disasters. 
This program, established in 1968, was originally designed to guarantee the availability of flood 
insurance while simultaneously promoting new controls to limit vulnerable development in 
flood-prone areas. 
 
Unfortunately, the program now provides a major subsidy, not only for pre-existing development 
but also for new development in floodplains, with the result that the program has actually 
become a major engine for unwise development in floodplains. In some cases property owners 
have received multiple payments because their properties flooded time and again, despite the fact 
that, in the absence of the federal program, no rational individual would rebuild and no rational 
private insurer would offer coverage in the floodplain. In addition, the majority of NFIP flood 
maps are out-of-date, with the result that many maps fail to identify properties that are within the 
100-year flood plain and should be covered by insurance. Finally, as we discuss in our report, 
because the federal government bears the lion's share of the financial risks associated with 
unwise development, local governments sometimes act recklessly by encouraging floodplain 
development. 
 
The concern that political pressures would lead the federal government to adopt policies leading 
to under-pricing of disaster insurance becomes even more serious when one considers the fact 
that environmental factors are likely to put significant upward pressure on insurance rates. The 
growing scientific consensus about global warming suggests that sea levels will rise significantly 
over the next century, making more coastal areas vulnerable to storm damage. In addition, 
because of the commencement of a natural cycle of heavy hurricane intensity, and perhaps due to 
global warming, hurricanes apparently are becoming more intense. As coastal areas become 
more prone to storm damage, common sense suggests that, absent government interference, 
insurance rates would rise in order to cover the larger risks. Higher rates would also have the 
salutary effect of sending property owners and investors valuable price signals about the hazards 
they face. On the other hand, if insurance rates were constrained for political reasons, insurance 
rates both would become increasingly divorced from fair rates as determined by the character of 
the underlying risks and would not effectively inform owners and investors about the risks they 
face. 
 
All of the likely negative consequences of federal government intervention in the insurance 
business, as serious as they appear to be, might be acceptable if a government backstop were the 
only alternative. But our review of the available evidence indicates, at a minimum, that the 
proponents of federal intervention have not made the case that private reinsurance and innovative 
capital instruments cannot serve this backstop function as well or better than the U.S. Treasury. 
 
By way of background, it is noteworthy that a federal takeover of the flood insurance business 
was hardly the only possible option. In the early part of the last century, after a series of 
disastrous Mississippi River floods, Congress began to debate the need for federal flood 
insurance. On the theory that the risks involved were too unpredictable and/or beyond the 
capacity of private insurers to deal with, Congress eventually created the National Flood 
Insurance Program. But other nations have left the business of flood insurance largely if not 
entirely to private insurers. It is fair to ask whether our nation's overall vulnerability to flood 
risks would be lower today if Congress had never created the flood insurance program and left 
the business of flood insurance to private insurers. 
 
Recent developments in the insurance industry suggest that the private sector can succeed in 
providing insurance to citizens and businesses in hazardous coastal areas at a fair price that 
reflects the true costs of the covered risks. While hurricanes and other coastal storms are not an 
every day event, the occurrence of coastal storms and the magnitude of the potential economic 
losses are reasonably predictable. There is now a small but rapidly growing business in 
generating detailed predictions about where storms will occur and with what impact, as described 
in Michael Lewis's article in the August 26, 2007, New York Times Sunday Magazine. These 
predictive data are in turn providing the information base necessary to support capital 
investments in insuring against coastal disasters. There is now reportedly a $14 billion market in 
investments in disaster insurance and the market continues to grow. 
 
So far as we have been able to determine through our research, there is no serious obstacle to 
reinsurers and private investors supplying the necessary backstop for a well functioning coastal 
disaster insurance business. Given the size of the worldwide capital markets, and the likely 
magnitude of future disasters, the capital market appears adequate in size to absorb the inevitable 
year to year swings in the number of disasters. Over time, as the predictive data improve in 
quality, and investors gain experience in pricing these instruments, the prices of these 
instruments should stabilize at a level that fairly and accurately reflects the underlying risks. The 
participation of numerous investors in this market, each with a relatively small stake in the 
overall risk pool, should, again over time, reduce if not eliminate the premiums that investors 
apparently now demand based on the unpredictability of coastal disasters (the so- called "timing 
problem"). 
 
Thus, the most serious obstacle to the eventual emergence of a private market solution to the 
current so-called insurance crisis appears to be potential federal legislation that would allow the 
federal government to effectively supplant the private sector and cause the private market in 
disaster insurance instruments to shrink and wither away. 
 
In sum, the best federal government policy with regard to coastal disaster insurance appears to be 
a policy of doing as little as possible. On the one hand, there is a substantial danger that federal 
intervention would lead to unfair and inefficiently low insurance rates for coastal disasters. On 
the other hand, there is no apparent reason why, over time, the private insurance companies and 
investors cannot support a well-functioning insurance business in which insurance premiums 
reflect the true market price of the coverage. No doubt there are risks of dramatic swings in the 
private marketplace based on the emergence of new information and irrational market 
sentiments. But, on balance, the risk to the taxpayer and to the country's general economic 
welfare appears significantly lower if, to the extent possible, the business of investment is left to 
insurance companies and to private investors. 
 
This is not to suggest that there is no role for the federal government (and state governments) in 
the insurance market for coastal disaster insurance. As detailed in the recent Institute report, 
there appear to be at least several targeted reforms worth considering. First, the federal 
government could play a useful role in generating better maps and other data that would allow 
insurance companies and other private firms to do a better job of estimating the magnitude of the 
risks associated with different areas of the coast as well as with specific properties. These data 
would allow insurance companies to do a better job of fine tuning insurance rates to reflect the 
risks associated with individual properties and avoid generalized premium structures that ignore 
differences between properties. In addition, these data would be of assistance to Applied 
Insurance Research and similar companies that develop risk assessments of coastal hazards. 
While the NFIP has done a woefully poor job of keeping flood maps current, the existence of a 
growing private sector audience for coastal hazard information offers hope that the federal 
government might develop a stronger information dissemination capability in the future. 
 
Second, Congress should consider amending the Internal Revenue Code to eliminate taxation of 
insurance premiums that companies devote to reserve funds to cover catastrophic loses. Under 
current law, private insurers pay ordinary taxes on any portion of the premium they set aside as a 
reserve against future losses, leaving companies with little incentive to set aside adequate funds 
to cover catastrophic losses. Allowing insurance companies to "bank" premiums to cover future 
catastrophes would allow companies to treat disaster insurance like other, more predictable lines 
of coverage, and expand companies' capacity to offer hurricane insurance. If it were to pursue 
this option, Congress would need to take care to ensure that banked premiums are eventually 
used to pay disaster insurance claims and not simply accumulated as an untaxed corporate asset. 
 
Third, Congress should consider providing targeted financial assistance to low and moderate 
income families that have been particularly hard hit by spikes in coastal insurance rates. This 
assistance should be limited to those who purchased their properties at least several years ago 
and who can fairly claim that they purchased their properties without full knowledge of the 
hazards involved. To avoid distorting the insurance market and creating so-called "moral hazard" 
problems, this relief should not be supplied in the form of lower insurance rates, but rather in the 
form of direct grants or, as recently suggested by one of the co-directors of the Wharton School's 
Risk Management and Decision Processes Center, through some type of voucher system. 
 
At the state level, state governments should consider making wind insurance mandatory for all 
those in vulnerable areas of the coast. Automobile liability insurance is mandatory in most states, 
and Massachusetts now requires all residents to carry health insurance. Given the infrequency of 
coastal disasters, citizens tend to discount the nature of the risk they face and therefore tend to 
underinsure. Mandatory coastal disaster insurance would overcome this psychological effect, 
enhance every community's ability to deal with a disaster, and compel citizens to recognize and 
take into account the different level of hazard associated with building and owning property in 
different areas. 
 
Finally, I offer the following brief comments on H.R. 3355, the Homeowners Defense Act of 
2007. First, the bill does not appear to advance the goals of fairness and efficiency I outlined at 
the beginning of my testimony. Through the liquidity and catastrophic loan programs, the bill 
would make the federal government the financial backstop for states (with or without "qualified" 
state reinsurance programs) by requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to make loans to states at 
predetermined interest rates. There is no indication that these interest rates are intended to match 
the market price of providing insurance for the covered risks. In fact, the proposed rates appear 
significantly lower than those now being earned in the capital markets by cat-bonds. The bill also 
includes a broad provision for extending the term of any loan upon state request. The predictable 
effect of these provisions would be to extend an unfair taxpayer-funded subsidy to those who 
choose to live and work in hazardous coastal areas, encourage further development in hazard-
prone areas, and stifle the development of a private market backstop for coastal disaster 
insurance. 
 
One striking feature of the bill is the complete absence of any explicit requirement that local or 
state governments take specific steps to control and mitigate disaster risks as a condition for 
eligibility for the federal backstop. The effectiveness of such mandates is questionable, based on 
experience under the National Flood Insurance Program. Nonetheless, it would seem appropriate, 
at a minimum, to consider mandating risk mitigation and control in order to decrease, at least to 
some degree, the incentives these federal loan programs would otherwise provide for unwise 
coastal development. 
 
The purpose and likely effect of creating the proposed consortium is unclear. As I have 
discussed, there is a role for the federal government in generating additional hazard data 
information and disseminating that information to private insurers and risk assessment firms, and 
the consortium might help serve that function. But it appears doubtful that states facing relatively 
low levels of risk would perceive any particular advantage in banding together with states facing 
higher risk levels in order to seek pooled investments to help cover coastal disaster risks. In 
addition, from the point of view of reinsurers and private investors, it appears questionable 
whether there would be any particular advantage in a quasi-federal entity attempting to pool risks 
in a way that the market might or might not find attractive. As we describe in our report, private 
insurers are already independently putting together packages of different types of risks in order 
to attract more outside investors. 
 
Finally, to the extent the existence of the consortium would create the misperception that the 
federal government is prepared to backstop state insurance programs, the mere creation of the 
consortium would likely skew insurance premiums and encourage unwise development. 
 
Thank you for the opportunity to testify and I would be happy to respond to any questions that 
members of the Committee may have. 
